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Briefs Recently Filed

Trump v. Hawaii

One of the questions the Supreme Court may decide in Trump v. Hawaii is whether lower federal courts have the authority to provide injunctive relief that benefits non-parties as well as the party asking for relief. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief arguing in favor of lower federal courts authority to issue injunctive relief that benefits non-parties.

In this case Hawaii, the Muslim Association of Hawaii, and three individuals sued President Trump claiming the third travel ban, which indefinitely prevents immigration from six countries:  Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Yemen, was illegal and unconstitutional.

In December 2017 the Ninth Circuit temporarily struck down the third travel ban. Instead of limiting the injunction to just the parties that sued the President, the Ninth Circuit issued an injunction applying to “foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” The Supreme Court agreed to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

The federal government argues that lower federal courts do not have the authority to issue injunctions which benefit anyone other than the party asking for the injunction.

The SLLC amicus brief disagrees. The brief points out that injunctions benefiting non-parties are extremely common. “In fact, they have figured in many [Supreme] Court cases. This is why the courts of appeals have unanimously held that injunctions may benefit non-parties.” The brief argues these injunctions are especially important where federalism is at stake. Most local governments are very small. They lack the resources to litigate against the United States. So local governments have to rely on one of the big cities to get an injunctions against the federal government (no matter what political party is currently in charge).

The SLLC brief does not take a position on whether the lower courts in this particular case had the authority to issue an injunction that benefited non-parties. Likewise the SLLC brief didn’t take a position on the other legal issues in this case.

The Supreme Court has agreed to decide three other issues. First, whether the case is justiciable, meaning whether the legal issues are “fit for review.” Second, whether the third travel ban exceeds the President’s authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Third, whether the travel ban violates the Establishment Clause.

In Hawaii v. Trump the Ninth Circuit concluded the travel ban exceeds the President’s authority under the INA because it bans immigration indefinitely and “ma[de] no finding whatsoever that foreign nationals’ nationality alone renders entry of this broad class of individuals a heightened security risk to the United States.” The Fourth Circuit ruled it likely violates the Establishment Clause because its primary purpose is to discriminate against Muslims.

Stuart Banner of the UCLA School of Law Supreme Court Clinic wrote the SLLC amicus brief which the following organizations joined:  the National League of Cities, the International City/County Management Association, and the International Municipal Lawyers Association.

South Dakota v. Wayfair

The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed a Supreme Court amicus brief in one of the most important cases of the organizations 35-year tenure:  South Dakota v. Wayfair.  

In this case South Dakota is asking the Supreme Court to rule that states and local governments may require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales tax. Ruling this way will require the Supreme Court to overturn long-standing precedent.  

In 1967 in National Bellas Hess  v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, the Supreme Court held that per its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, states and local governments cannot require businesses to collect sales tax unless the business has a physical presence in the state.

Twenty-five years later in Quill v. North Dakota (1992), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the physical presence requirement but admitted that “contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result” as the Court had reached in Bellas Hess.

Customers buying from remote sellers still owe sale tax but they rarely pay it when the remote seller does not collect it. Congress has the authority to overrule Bellas Hess and Quill but has thus far not done so.

In March 2015 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion stating that the “legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill.” Justice Kennedy criticized Quill in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl for many of the same reasons the SLLC stated in its amicus brief in that case. Specifically, internet sales have risen astronomically since 1992 and states and local governments are unable to collect most taxes due on sales from out-of-state vendors.

Following the Kennedy opinion a number of state legislatures passed laws requiring remote vendors to collect sales tax in clear violation of Quill. South Dakota’s law was the first ready for Supreme Court review. It requires out-of-state retailers to collect sales tax if they annually conduct $100,000 worth of business or 200 separate transactions in South Dakota.

The SLLC amicus brief points out that states and local governments lost an estimated $26 billion in sales tax revenue in 2015 because they were unable to collect owed taxes. The brief encourages the Court to overturn Quill. If the Court decides to replace the physical presence requirement the SLLC encourages the Court to adopt an economic nexus requirement—like the one the South Dakota legislature adopted. 

Tillman Breckenridge, Bailey Glasser, and Patricia Roberts, William & Mary Law School Appellate and Supreme Court Clinic, wrote the SLLC amicus brief which the following organizations joined: the National Governors Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, the National Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, the United States Conference of Mayors, the International City/County Management Association, the International Municipal Lawyers Association, the Government Finance Officers Association, National Public Labor Relations Association, the International Public Management Association for Human Resources, National State Treasurers Association, National School Boards Association, AASA, the School Superintendents Association, the National Association of Elementary School Principals, and the Association of School Business Officials International.

NIFLA v. Becerra 

In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona (2015) the Supreme Court held that strict (usually fatal) scrutiny applies to content-based regulations of speech. One of the questions in NIFLA v. Becerra is whether the Court means for Reed to apply to (nearly) every law regulating content-based speech. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief arguing that Reed should not be read that broadly.     

California law requires that licensed pregnancy-related clinics disseminate a notice stating that publically-funded family planning services, including contraception and abortion are available. It also requires unlicensed pregnancy-related clinics to disseminate a notice they are unlicensed. The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) operates 111 pregnancy centers in California. None offer abortions or abortion referrals; only 73 are licensed.

In NIFLA v. Becerra NIFLA claims that both requirements violate the First Amendment Free Speech Clause. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.

In its brief NIFLA argues that following Reed strict scrutiny applies to nearly any content-based regulation of speech, including the laws at issue in this case. Per strict scrutiny, a regulation of speech must serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored. It is difficult for government regulation of speech to pass strict scrutiny.

The SLLC amicus brief doesn’t take a position on whether the disclosure laws at issue in this case violate the First Amendment. Instead, it points out that for decades the Supreme Court has not applied strict scrutiny to laws regulating commercial speech and sexually oriented businesses even though such laws regulate speech based on their content. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult movie theatres (versus other movie theatres) near residential areas, churches, parks, and schools. The Court didn’t apply strict scrutiny in that case.

The brief argues that Reed “did not mention, let alone overrule, any of this Court’s precedents that applied [lower] scrutiny to laws that differentiated by certain subjects or topics. This Court should not construe Reed as having silently done so, nor explicitly do so here.”   

Finally, the brief points out that local governments require numerous notice and disclosure requirements (e.g., restaurants must post signs explaining how to provide first aid to choking patrons) which under NILFA’s interpretation of Reed would be subject to strict scrutiny. Such (often innocuous) ordinance might no longer be constitutional.

John Baker, Katherine Swenson, Karl Procaccini, Holley Horrell, and Virginia McCalmont, Greene Espel, wrote the SLLC amicus brief which the following organizations joined:  the National League of Cities, the United States Conference of Mayors, the International City/County Management Association, and the International Municipal Lawyers Association.

Minnesota Voter Alliance v. Mansky 

In its Supreme Court amicus brief in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) argues that states and local governments should be able to ban political apparel at polling places. County election officials and the Minnesota Secretary of State were sued for violating the First Amendment in this case.

At least eight states (Delaware, Kansas, Montana, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont) other than Minnesota have enacted similar bans.

Andrew Cilek was temporarily prevented from voting for wearing two items of political apparel: a t-shirt that stated “Don’t Tread on Me,” with a picture of the Gadsden Flag and a small Tea Party logo; and an Election Integrity Watch (EIW) button that stated “Please I.D. Me” with EIW’s website and phone number.

The Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota’s law is constitutional citing Burson v. Freeman (1992). In that case the Supreme Court upheld a Tennessee statute that banned the solicitation of votes and campaign materials within 100 feet of the polling place.

The Minnesota Voters Alliance argues the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad describing it as having a “breathtaking reach” that criminalizes “all political speech that can be communicated through shirts, hats, buttons, and other apparel,” even though that speech assertedly “imposes no demands or burdens on others.”

The SLLC amicus brief responds to the other side’s arguments head-on. “Far from marking out a ‘breathtaking’ scope, Minnesota’s statute addresses speech in only one very limited and specialized location: the polling place. The law is directed at a type of display that threatens to interfere with the right of voters to cast their ballots freely, without intimidation or disruption. And it states a reasonable rule that has been applied by numerous States—without challenge or, for all that appears, any significant limitation on political debate—for over a century.”

Charles Rothfeld, Andrew Pincus, Michael Kimberly, and Paul Hughes of Mayer Brown and Eugene Fidell of the Yale Supreme Court Clinic wrote the SLLC amicus brief which the following organizations joined:  the National Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, the United States Conference of Mayors, the International City/County Management Association, and the International Municipal Lawyers Association.

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach

The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) Supreme Court amicus brief in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach argues if probable cause exists to make an arrest the arrestee should be barred from bringing a First Amendment retaliatory arrest lawsuit.

Fane Lozman lived in a floating house in the Riviera Beach Marina. The City proposed to redevelop the marina using eminent domain and Lozman became “an outspoken critic” regularly criticizing the mayor and city council at council meetings. At a city council meeting Lozman offered comments about former county commissioners who had served in other communities being arrested. A councilperson had Lozman arrested for refusing to stop talking. Lozman was not ultimately charged with disorderly conduct or resisting arrest.

He sued the City claiming they arrested him in violation of his First Amendment free speech rights for opposing the City’s redevelopment plan. The City argued Lozman was arrested for violating the City’s rule that comments during the public comment period must relate to City business.

A jury ruled against Lozman. The Eleventh Circuit held that the jury’s finding of probable cause to arrest him for disturbing a lawful assembly wasn’t against the great weight of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit then concluded because the arrest was supported by probable cause Lozman’s First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim failed. Before the Supreme Court Lozman argues that even if probable cause existed to arrest him he should still be able to bring a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.

The SLLC amicus brief argues that the Supreme Court should hold that arrestees must prove the absence of probable cause to bring a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. If probable cause is present and officers can still be sued states and local governments will have more difficulty maintaining order and safety at local-government meetings, public protests and demonstrations, and political rallies. The 50 state constitutions also protect free speech. State courts may interpret state constitutions more broadly than the federal constitution. And internal disciplinary measures within state and local police departments offer “meaningful remedies for true victims of retaliation.”

Sean Gallagher, Bennett Cohen, and Britton St. Onge of Polsinelli wrote the SLLC amicus brief which the following organizations joined:  the National Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, the United States Conference of Mayors, the International City/County Management Association, and the International Municipal Lawyers Association.

Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. SolarCity (settled)

In its amicus brief in Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. SolarCity, the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) urges the Supreme Court to rule that a district court’s denial of state-action immunity to a state or local government is immediately appealable.

The state-action doctrine provides states and, in some instances, local governments immunity from federal antitrust liability.

SolarCity sells and leases rooftop solar-energy panels. The Salt River Power District, a political subdivision of Arizona, is the only traditional supplier of power near where many SolarCity customers live. SolarCity claims that to prevent it from installing more panels the Power District introduced a new pricing structure. Now if a customer obtains power from his or her own system he or she must pay a “prohibitively large penalty.”

SolarCity sued the Power District claiming it violated federal antitrust law. The Power District argued it is immune from federal antitrust liability per the state-action doctrine.

The federal district court denied the Power District’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit citing “uncertainties about the specifics of the Power District’s state-law authority and business.” The Power District sought to immediately appeal the district court’s denial of state-action immunity rather than waiting until after the district court ruled whether it violated antitrust law.

Generally, only final decisions of lower courts may be appealed. Here, the district court’s denial of Power District’s motion to dismiss isn’t final because the district court must still decide whether the Power District violated antitrust law. The “collateral-order” doctrine allows non-final judgments to be appealed in some instances. The Ninth Circuit held it does not apply to orders denying public entities state-action immunity.

The SLLC amicus brief argues that “important federalism and policy considerations” weigh in favor allowing states and local governments to appeal denials of state-action immunity immediately. More specifically, “because the extension of state-action immunity to governmental entities is rooted in the State’s own sovereign immunity, permitting interlocutory appeal is necessary to respect State sovereignty.” Likewise, “compelling governmental entities to endure trial court antitrust litigation to final judgment after denial of a state-action immunity motion exposes governmental entities and their taxpaying residents to enormous costs and risks.”

Tillman Lay, Katharine Mapes, Jessica Bell, and Amber Martin of Spiegel & McDiarmid wrote the SLLC amicus brief which the following organizations joined:  the National Governors Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, the National Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, the United States Conference of Mayors, the International City/County Management Association, and the International Municipal Lawyers Association.

City of Hays, Kansas v. Vogt

The Fifth Amendment says no person shall be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In Hays, Kansas v. Vogt the Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when a public employee’s compelled, self-incriminating statements are used against him or her at a probable cause hearing rather than at a trial.

The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief supporting the City of Hays arguing that the City should not be liable for the use of such statements because it has no control over how a prosecutor uses them. 

In Garrity v. New Jersey (1967) the Supreme Court held that public employers violate the Fifth Amendment when they give employees a choice between “self-incrimination or job forfeiture,” which is what Matthew Vogt claims happened to him.

Vogt worked as a police officer for the City of Hays. In an interview with the City of Haysville, Vogt disclosed he had kept a knife he obtained in the course of his work as a Hays police officer. Haysville offered Vogt the job but told him he had to tell Hays about the knife and return it. Vogt did so.

The Hays police chief told Vogt to write a report about the knife; Vogt wrote a vague one-sentence statement. The Hays police chief then told Vogt to write a more detailed statement. Vogt claims this more detailed statement was a compelled, self-incriminating statement. It was used to locate more evidence.

Vogt was charged with two felonies related to possessing the knife. Per state law, he received a probable cause hearing before trial. Charges were dismissed at the probable cause hearing.

Vogt sued the City of Hays claiming that it violated his right to be free from self-incrimination because his compelled, incriminating statements were used against him in a probable cause hearing. The Tenth Circuit concluded the right against self-incrimination is more than a trial right by looking at the text of the Fifth Amendment, which doesn’t use the term “trial” or “criminal prosecution.”

The SLLC amicus brief argues that government employers should not be liable for the use of compelled, self-incriminating statements by prosecutors at a probable cause hearings (or at trials) because government employers have no control over whether or how a prosecutor uses such statements. If government employers can be liable for the actions of prosecutors they may be less likely to ferret out employee misconduct. Alternatively, the SLLC amicus brief argues Vogt’s sole remedy in this case should be the exclusion of his statements in his criminal case, not money damages against the City.

Stuart Raphael, Hunton Williams, wrote the SLLC amicus brief which was joined by the National Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, the United States Conference of Mayors, the International City/County Management Association, the International Municipal Lawyers Association, the National Public Employer Labor Relations Association, and the International Public Management Association for Human Resources. 

South Dakota v. Wayfair (cert stage)

The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) has filed an amicus brief asking the Supreme Court to agree to hear South Dakota’s petition in South Dakota v. Wayfair. In this case South Dakota is asking the Supreme Court to hold that states may require out-of-state retailers to collect sales tax.

In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota (1992), the Supreme Court held that states cannot require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales tax.

In March 2015 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion stating that the “legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill.” Justice Kennedy criticized Quill in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl for many of the same reasons the SLLC stated in its amicus brief in that case. Specifically, internet sales have risen astronomically since 1992 and states and local governments are unable to collect most taxes due on sales from out-of-state vendors.

Following the Kennedy opinion a number of state legislatures passed laws requiring remote vendors to collect sales tax. South Dakota’s law is the first to be ready for review by the Supreme Court. In September South Dakota’s highest state court ruled that the South Dakota law is unconstitutional because it clearly violates Quill and it is up to the Supreme Court to overrule it. In October South Dakota filed a certiorari petition asking the Supreme Court to hear its case and overrule Quill.   

The SLLC amicus brief makes two main points. First, it explains why this is the right case for the Court to take. In recent years numerous cases (and state laws) have challenged Quill at the margins. This case directly asks the Court to decide whether to overturn Quill without any distractions like factual issues. Second, now is the right time for the Court to consider overturning Quill because states and local governments are failing to collect billions of dollars in tax revenue annually at an increasing rate due to rising online sales.

The brief cites a study by the National Conference of State Legislatures and the International Council of Shopping Centers which estimated that in 2015, uncollected sales taxes from remote sales were almost $26 billion. Of this $26 billion, over $17 billion uncollected taxes were projected to be from electronic sales.    

At this point all South Dakota and its amici, including the SLLC, are asking the Supreme Court to do is agree to hear this case. Supreme Court review is discretionary; four of the nine Supreme Court Justices must agree to hear any case. If the Supreme Court refuses to do so, the South Dakota Supreme Court ruling that South Dakota’s law is unconstitutional will stay in place. 

It is possible the Court could hear this case this term meaning it would issue an opinion by the end of June 2018.   

Tillman Breckenridge, Bailey & Glasser, wrote the SLLC amicus brief which the following organizations joined: the National Governors Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, the National Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, the United States Conference of Mayors, the International City/County Management Association, the International Municipal Lawyers Association, the Government Finance Officers Association, the International Public Management Association for Human Resources, National School Boards Association, National AASA:  The School Superintendents Association, and the National Association of Elementary School Principals.  

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission

In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission the Supreme Court will decide whether Colorado's public accommodations law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, violates a cake artist’s First Amendment free speech and free exercise rights. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief supporting Colorado arguing that the Court should not create an exception to Colorado’s public accommodations law for wedding businesses.  

The owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack C. Phillips, declined to design and make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple because of his religious beliefs.

The couple filed a complaint against Masterpiece claiming it violated Colorado's public accommodations law. Masterpiece argued that being required to comply with the law violates Phillips’ free speech and free exercise rights.

The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected both of Masterpiece’s claims.  

For speech to be protected by the First Amendment it must convey a particularized message. According to the Colorado Court of Appeals: “Masterpiece does not convey a message supporting same-sex marriages merely by abiding by the law and serving its customers equally.”

Regarding Masterpiece’s free exercise of religion claim, the lower court applied rational basis analysis to Colorado’s law and “easily conclude[d] that it is rationally related to Colorado’s interest in eliminating discrimination in places of public accommodation.”

The SLLC brief points out that local governments have a long history of protecting people against discrimination when the federal government has been unwilling or unable to legislate. Protecting citizens against sexual-orientation discrimination for many local governments is part of that proud tradition. Over 100 local governments in 38 states have adopted ordinances protecting citizens from sexual-orientation discrimination in public accommodations.

Additionally, the brief notes that local governments have adopted these ordinances at the level of government closest to the people after careful and thoughtful deliberation. They believe that such ordinances are key to creating and maintaining vibrant, safe, healthy communities that are attractive places to live and to work.

Finally, the brief argues that these laws work best if there are no exceptions. Exceptions for wedding businesses would weaken and undermine the democratic choices of these cities and states.

The National League of Cities, the International City/County Management Association, and the International Municipal Lawyers Association joined the SLLC brief which was written by Bruce La Pierre, Washington Unviersity School of Law Appellate Clinic and Brian Walsh, Bryan Cave. 

Christie v. NCAA 

In Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association New Jersey Governor Chris Christie argues that because the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) prohibits the state from repealing laws restricting gambling it amounts to unconstitutional commandeering. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief supporting Christie.

PASPA, adopted in 1992, makes it unlawful for states and local governments to authorize gambling.

New Jersey first amended its constitution to allow some sports gambling. The Third Circuit held that doing so violated PASPA as an “authorization” of gambling but concluded that repealing restrictions on sports gambling would be okay. New Jersey then passed a law repealing restrictions on sports gambling. The Third Circuit changed course ruling the repeal violates PASPA. It reasoned that the repeal “authorizes sports gambling by selectively dictating where sports gambling may occur, who may place bets in such gambling, and which athletic contests are permissible subjects for such gambling.”

Per the anti-commandeering doctrine, “Congress ‘lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit’ acts which Congress itself may require or prohibit.” In both cases Christie argued that PASPA unconstitutionally commandeers states in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The Third Circuit concluded PASPA is constitutional reasoning that it “does not command states to take affirmative actions, and it does not present a coercive choice.”

The SLLC amicus brief argues that, regarding sports gambling, the Third Circuit decision leaves states with only one viable option:  freeze bans in place enacted before PASPA. But, “Congress cannot, on the one hand, fail to preempt the field by way of enacting a federal regime for the regulation of sports wagering and, on the other hand, prevent states from taking any meaningful action to revise their laws to reflect constituent opinion.”

Beyond sports gambling, the SLLC amicus brief also argues that “rationale of the Third Circuit’s decision upholding its reading of PASPA would permit Congress to order state and local governments to freeze state and local law . . . on other issues of critical importance,” ranging from issues such as physician-assisted death for the terminally ill to self-driving cars. 

Richard A. Simpson, Tara Ward, and Emily Hart, Wiley Rein, wrote the SLLC amicus brief which was joined by the National Governors Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, National League of Cities, and the International Municipal Lawyers Association.

Husted v. A. Philip Randloph Institute 

In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute the Supreme Court will decide whether federal law allows states to remove people from the voter rolls if the state sends them a confirmation notice after they haven’t voted for two years, they don’t respond to the notice, and then they don’t vote in the next four years.

While Ohio is being sued in this case twelve other states use a similar process. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief in this case supporting Ohio.

The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) says that roll maintenance procedures “shall not result in” people being removed from the polls for failure to vote. The Help America Vote Act modified the NVRA to say that states may remove voters if they don’t respond to a confirmation notice and don’t vote in the next two federal election cycles.

The Sixth Circuit struck down Ohio’s scheme reasoning that it “constitutes perhaps the plainest possible example of a process that ‘result[s] in’ removal of a voter from the rolls by reason of his or her failure to vote.” According to the lower court the problem with Ohio’s scheme is that the “trigger” for someone being removed from the voter rolls is their failure to vote.

Ohio argues that it doesn’t remove voters “’by reason of’ their failure to vote; it removes voters ‘by reason of’” their failure to respond to a notice. The state also claims that the NVRA doesn’t regulate what triggers the confirmation notice.

The SLLC amicus brief points out that hundreds, if not thousands, of states and local governments are tasked with registering voters and maintaining voter rolls. Processes vary based on factors including state law and resources; so, states and local governments need clear direction and flexibility regarding what process they may use to maintain voter rolls. The brief points out that while in this case Ohio is being sued for the process it uses to take people off the rolls, states and local governments have been sued for keeping ineligible voters on the rolls.

Joshua Davis, Reed Smith wrote the SLLC brief which the following organizations joined: the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, the National Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, the United States Conference of Mayors, the International City/County Management Association, and the International Municipal Lawyers Association.